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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court erroneously granted summary 
judgment for Plaintiffs. The determination of whether a party is 
entitled to summary judgment is a conclusion of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness with no deference given to the district 
court. Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1998); Higgins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) . Moreover, 
Mi]t is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a trial 
court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court 
relied on some other ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 
(Utah 1995). 
2. Whether the district court utilized the proper standard 
of review in the course of granting summary judgment. This is a 
legal issue that is reviewed for correctness. See Springville 
Citizens for Better Community v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 332, 
336 (Utah 1999). "It is well-settled that an appellate court may 
affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though 
the trial court relied on some other ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 
P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
6 
3. Whether the total lack of evidence supporting the City 
Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application was 
supported by substantial evidence. This is a legal issue that is 
reviewed for correctness. See Springville Citizens for Better 
Community v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999). 
"It is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a trial 
court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court 
relied on some other ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 
(Utah 1995) . 
4. If the court determines that the "reasonably debatable" 
standard of judicial review is applicable to the instant case, the 
issue is whether the total lack of evidence supporting the City 
Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application is 
reasonable to the point that it is reasonably debatable. This is 
a legal issue that is reviewed for correctness. See Springville 
Citizens for Better Community v. City of Springville, 979 P. 2d 332, 
336 (Utah 1999). "It is well-settled that an appellate court may 
affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though 
the trial court relied on some other ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 
P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments 
of the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an adverse land use decision by the Payson 
City Council concerning Plaintiffs' property (also referred to as 
"the Property"), which is governed by The Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
101, et seq. The Payson City Council's decision was an arbitrary 
and capricious denial of Plaintiffs' application to rezone their 
property from R-l-A to R-2-75. Plaintiffs sought to have their 
property rezoned from the R-l-A residential designation to the R-2-
75 higher density multi-family zoning designation. 
Plaintiffs initiated this action, claiming the City Council's 
denials of their rezone requests were arbitrary and capricious, and 
that the denials constituted a taking without just compensation. 
Thereafter, Payson City Corporation filed a motion for summary 
judgment, demanding that the district court dismiss the complaint 
because the Payson City Council had acted within its legislative 
prerogative. Plaintiffs responded and filed a motion for summary 
8 
judgment, arguing that the City Council's decisions were arbitrary 
and capricious. 
At the initially scheduled hearing for oral arguments on the 
motions for summary judgment, the district court expressed concern 
about the lack of basis to deny the rezone requests in the minutes 
of the public hearings on the rezone applications. Consequently, 
the district court directed Payson City Corporation to prepare 
findings setting forth the basis of the City Council's decisions. 
Shortly thereafter, the City submitted Findings of the City Council 
Decision, setting forth the reasons why the City Council denied 
Plaintiffs' rezone applications. 
After hearing oral arguments on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court took the matter under advisement. By 
way of Memorandum Decision, the district court granted Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Payson City Corporation's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Shortly thereafter, the district 
court signed its final Order concerning the foregoing. Payson City 
Corporation subsequently filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs provide the following Statement of Facts to the 
extent that the Statement of Facts in Payson City Corporation's 
Brief fails to accurately or adequately state bhe applicable facts: 
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1. At the time Plaintiff's applied for a rezone, the subject 
property was located within an area zoned as R-l-A, which is a 
residential zone with some large animal rights (R. 79, Payson City 
Corporation's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Hi; R. 70-71, Affidavit of Andy Hall in Support of Payson City 
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, %2); 
2. Plaintiffs' property is surrounded by property designated 
as R-l-A for residential use (R. 42, Payson Planning Zone Map).1 
Not more than two and one-half blocks east of the Property, 
however, is a large, expansive piece of property that is designated 
as R-2-75, which is the same zoning designation that was requested 
by Plaintiffs (See id.); 
3. The 1995 Payson City General Plan states that residential 
areas should be encouraged to locate east of the 1-15 buffer, and 
that zoning ordinances that utilize 1-15 as a buffer should be 
enacted (See R. 50 and 52, Payson City General Plan 1995) .2 In 
direct contrast, the Official Payson City General Plan Map, which 
xThe Payson Planning Zone Map in the record on appeal reveals 
that this R-2-75 property abutting the subject property is located on 
both the west and east sides of 1-15 (R. 42, Payson Planning Zone 
Map) . 
2The Payson City General Plan also establishes the policy of 
providing for a "mixture of residential densities" by zoning 
"locations for low, medium, and high density housing." (See R. 51, 
Payson City General Plan 1995). 
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was adopted July 5, 1995, provides for large areas of residential 
use west of 1-15 (See R. 43, Official General Plan Map); 
4. In January 1996, Plaintiffs submitted their application 
to rezone their property from R-l-A to R-2-75, which is a 
residential zoning designation that permits multiple family 
dwellings (See R. 177-78, Zoning Change Application; Affidavit of 
Andy Hall in Support of Payson City Corporation's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, *|3) / 
5. On February 8, 1996, Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone 
application came before the Planning Commission (See R. 166-67, 
Payson Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, February 8, 1996). 
During the meeting, the Commission engaged in general discussion 
about the rezone request and the character of the property, which 
included an acknowledgment by Chairman Stewart that because "there 
are already other residential developments in the surrounding area 
where this rezone would take place, there may not be a problem in 
rezoning this to R-2-7500." (See id.). The Planning Commission 
then voted to recommend to the Payson City Council that a public 
hearing be held on the rezone to R-2-75 {Id.); 
6. By way of a Planning Commission Staff Report, dated March 
20, 1996, the Staff recommended that the Planning Commission 
recommend approval to the Payson City Council of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 
rezone application (See R. 173, Planning Commission Staff Report); 
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7. A public hearing on Plaintiff's rezone application was 
held before the Planning Commission on March 20, 1996 (See R. 153-
55, Payson City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, March 20, 
1996) . At the public hearing, a petition signed by thirty-eight 
people was submitted to the Commission by a neighborhood group that 
opposed the zoning change to R-2-75 (See id. at R. 155; R. 159-60, 
Petition). In addition to the Petition, thirteen individuals 
expressed their opposition to the R-2-75 rezone (See R. 154-55, 
Payson City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, March 20, 1996).3 
After the public comments, the Planning Commission recommended that 
the Payson City Council deny the R-2-75 rezone (See id. at R. 153) ; 
8. A few minutes after the Planning Commission adjourned, 
the Payson City Council held a public hearing on the R-2-75 rezone 
application (See R. 231-33, Payson City Council Meeting Minutes, 
March 20, 1996) . During the hearing, the Planning and Zoning 
Chairperson informed the City Council that the Planning Commission 
had just met "and after considering the public input, voted to deny 
the zone change." (See id. at R. 231). As with the public hearing 
before the Planning Commission, the thirty-eight signature Petition 
was submitted to the City Council by the neighborhood group that 
opposed the zoning change to R-2-75 (See id. at R. 232). Subject 
3Only five individuals spoke in favor of the R-2-75 rezone, four 
of which had an interest in the requested rezone (See R. 154-55, 
Payson City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, March 20, 1996). 
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to one or two exceptions, the same individuals appeared before the 
City Council as did before the Planning Commission (See id. at 232-
33). One exception was Mr. Jim Wilbert, an expert with twenty 
years of planning experience, who spoke in favor of the rezone 
because it "allows for affordable housing near the industrial 
park." (See id. at 232) . The City Council voted to deny the R-2-75 
rezone "based on the General Plan recommendation, traffic concerns 
relating to the industrial park, and [the Planning Commission's] 
recommendation." (See id. at R. 231); 
9, An Interoffice Memo from the Planning Commission to the 
City Council, dated May 10, 1996, explaining the reasons for 
recommending denial of the R-2-75 rezone application states, "The 
Planning Commission recommendation to the City Council was to not 
approve the [R-2-75] zone change jbecause of the opposition of the 
neighbors in that area." (See R. 110-11, Interoffice Memo); 
10. Plaintiffs submitted a second Zoning Change Application, 
requesting that their property be rezoned from R-l-A to R-1-9 (See 
R. 145, Zoning Change Application; R. 334, Findings of City Council 
Decision, f3) . Both the Planning Commission Staff and the Planning 
Commission recommended approval of the R-1-9 rezone (See R. 140, 
Planning Commission Staff Report, dated April 11, 1996; R. R. 122-
23, Payson City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, dated April 
11, 1996). After a public hearing during a City Council meeting, 
13 
the City Council voted to deny the R-l-9 rezone request (See R. 
222-23, Payson City Council Meeting Minutes, dated May 22, 1996); 
11. Plaintiffs appealed the Payson City Council's denials of 
their rezone requests by filing a Verified Complaint in Fourth 
District Court, alleging the Payson City Council's denials of their 
rezone requests were arbitrary and capricious, and that the denials 
constituted a taking without just compensation. (See R. 2-16, 
Verified Complaint); 
12. Payson City Corporation filed a motion for summary 
judgment, demanding that the district court dismiss the complaint 
because the Payson City Council had acted within its legislative 
prerogative (See R. 33-79, Payson City Corporation's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum). Plaintiffs responded 
and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the City 
Council's decisions were arbitrary and capricious (See R. 86-191, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities); 
13. At the initially scheduled hearing for oral arguments on 
the motions for summary judgment (see R. 281, Notice of Oral 
Arguments), the district court expressed concern about the lack of 
basis to deny the rezone in the minutes of the public hearings on 
the rezone applications (See R. 445, Transcript of Hearing Held 
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September 8, 1998, p. 3, lines 1-11, p. 4-5). Consequently, the 
district court directed Payson City Corporation to prepare findings 
setting forth the basis of the City Council's decisions to deny the 
rezone (See R. 282, Minutes Oral Arguments; R. 284-85, Order). 
Shortly thereafter, the City submitted Findings of the City Council 
Decision, setting forth the reasons why the City Council denied 
Plaintiffs' rezone applications (See R. 285-334, Findings of City 
Council Decision [sic]). The Findings were substantially the same, 
if no identical, in terms of providing the basis for the City 
Council's denials of the rezone requests; 
14. After hearing the parties' oral arguments on the cross-
motions for summary judgment, the district court took the matter 
under advisement (See R. 44 6, Transcript of Hearing Held January 
15, 1999, p. 32, lines 22-25); 
15. By way of Memorandum Decision, the district court granted 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Payson City 
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment (See R. 341-43, 
Memorandum Decision, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum A) . The district court determined that the 
Payson City Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone request 
was arbitrary and capricious (See id. at R. 342) . Because the City 
Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone request was arbitrary 
and capricious, the district court stated that it need not address 
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or "analyze the denial of the [Plaintiffs'] second [rezone] 
application (See id. at R. 341). Shortly thereafter, the district 
court signed its final Order (See R. 344-45, Order); 
16. Payson City Corporation subsequently filed Notice of 
Appeal (See R. 349-51, Notice of Appeal). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The correct standard for judicial review of land use 
decisions, such as that in the instant case, is enunciated in Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (3) (b) and is set forth by the recent Utah 
Supreme Court decision in Springville Citizens for a Better 
Community v. City of Springville. The plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-1001, in conjunction with the Utah Supreme Court's 
definitive interpretation of that statute in Springville Citizens, 
now supersedes any prior law, case law or otherwise, that 
recognizes a difference in the standards of review concerning city 
council administrative vis-a-vis legislative actions. 
2. In the course of granting summary judgment, the district 
court utilized the correct standard for judicial review of land use 
decisions, which is enunciated in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3)(b), 
and which is set forth in the recent Utah Supreme Court decision in 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 
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3. The district court applied the correct standard of 
judicial review set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 and as 
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Springville Citizens. 
4. The Payson City Council's denial of the R-2-75 rezone 
request was arbitrary and capricious because it was not supported 
by substantial evidence, which is required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-
9-1001 and the Springville Citizens case. 
5. Assuming, arguendo, that the "reasonably debatable" 
standard of judicial review applies to the City Council's decision, 
the undisputed facts demonstrate that the city council's denial of 
plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application was arbitrary and capricious. 
In the instant case, the record indisputably reveals that the City 
Council relied merely on public comment in the course of denying 
Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application. Moreover, the reasons 
provided by the City Council for its denial were in direct 
contradiction to the actual facts and circumstances surrounding the 
proposed rezone. Hence, the reasonableness of the City Council's 
decision is not even "fairly debatable." 
ARGUMENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no 
genuine issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
17 
as a matter of law." Springville Citizens For a Better Community 
v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 332, 336 (1999); see also Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c);4 accord Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 496-97 
(Utah 1998) (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P. 2d 231, 235 
(Utah 1993)) . "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we do not 
defer to the legal conclusions of the district court, but review 
them for correctness." Springville Citizens, 979 P. 2d at 336; 
Parker, 971 P. 2d at 497; Higgins, 855 P. 2d at 235. "When reviewing 
a municipality's land use decision, our review is limited to 
determining 'whether . . . the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal." Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (b) (1996)) . 
il. THE CORRECT STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF i.AJMH 
USE DECISIONS, WHICH T.S ENUNCIATED IN UTAH CODE 
ANN- § 10-9-1001(3)(b), IS SET FORTH BY THE RECENT 
UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISION IN Springville Citizens 
for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 
4Rule 56(c) provides in relevant part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
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Although, as advanced in recent Utah case law,5 there existed 
extensive case law in 1991 stating different standards of judicial 
review for administrative and legislative land use decisions, the 
Utah Legislature enacted a "one-size-fits-all standard of review" 
for "municipality [] land use decisions"6 when it passed what is now 
known as Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
1001(3) (b) (1999); Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 388 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 24, 30 (Utah Ct. App. February 10, 2000) (dissenting, J. 
Jackson). According to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3), "The courts 
shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are 
valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
In Springville Citizens, the Utah Supreme Court took the broad 
and plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 at face value, as 
it should, questioning not whether the Utah Legislature intended 
that two different standards of judicial review result from the 
5See Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 3 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 
n.5 (Utah Ct. App. February 10, 2000) (comparing Marshall v. Salt 
Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 705-06 (1943) with Xanthos v. 
Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P. 2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 
1984)) . 
6Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1), which governs appeals and 
enforcement of municipal land use decisions, states, "No person may 
challenge in district court a municipality's land use decisions made 
under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of 
this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies." (Emphasis added). 
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single and simple standard set forth in that statute. Id.7 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court, in Springville Citizens, refused 
to distinguish between the administrative and legislative 
functions. Rather, the supreme court, without reservation, 
accepted the Legislature's plain language and thereby made the 
"sweeping statement" that ua municipality's land use decision is 
arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial 
evidence." Springville Citizens, 979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999); 
Harmon City, 3 88 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. 
Notwithstanding the views of this Court or the views of Payson 
City Corporation concerning the appropriate standard of judicial 
review for reviewing the City Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-
75 rezone application in the instant case, the only recourse for 
this Court, according to principles of stare decisis, is to follow 
the supreme court's clear command in Springville Citizens. See 
7The Utah Supreme Court's reading of the standard of judicial 
review set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 is consistent with 
well-established standard rules of statutory construction. See 
Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998) 
(appellate court looks first to plain language "as the best indicator 
of the legislature's intent and purpose in passing the statute"); 
Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P. 2d 
1017, 1019 (Utah 1995) (statute should generally be construed 
according to its plain language); Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 
685, 686 (Utah 1989) (same); Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 811 P. 2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) (statutory words are to be read 
literally unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable); Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(same) . 
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Harmon City, 3 88 Utah Adv. Rep. at 3 0 (discussing "direct 
precedential effect" of Springville Citizens case). Consequently, 
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001, in conjunction 
with the Utah Supreme Court's definitive interpretation of that 
statute in Springville Citizens, now supersedes any prior law, case 
law or otherwise, that recognizes a difference in the standards of 
review concerning city council administrative vis-a-vis legislative 
actions. Id. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-
1001 AND AS ENUNCIATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN 
Springville Citizens. 
"A municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and 
capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence." 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 
979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999) (citing Patterson v. Utah County Bd. 
of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "In 
evaluating the City's decision under this standard, [the appellate 
court] review [s] the evidence in the record to ensure that the City 
proceeded within the limits of fairness and acted in good faith." 
Id. w [The appellate court] also determine[s] whether, in light of 
the evidence before the City, a reasonable mind could reach the 
same conclusion as the City." Id. (also citing 2 Young, Anderson's 
American Law of Zoning, § 11.11, at 461 (4th ed. 1996)) 
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(Parenthetical statement omitted). "[The appellate court] do[es] 
not, however, weigh the evidence anew or substitute [its] judgment 
for that of the municipality." Id. (citing Patterson, 893 P.2d at 
604 and Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 
1984)) . 
Payson City Corporation argues in its Brief that the district 
court incorrectly "viewed himself as conducting a plenary review 
which would allow him to make an independent decision based on the 
facts set forth in the legislative record." See Brief of 
Appellant, p. 17 (citing R. 446, Transcript of Hearing Held January 
15, 1999, p. 3) . A review of the discussion set forth in the cited 
transcript in the context of the complete record reveals that 
Payson City Corporation's argument is without merit. Initially, 
Payson City Corporation's "plenary review" argument is troubling 
because at the time the district court's comments were made, Payson 
City Corporation's legal counsel made absolutely no effort to 
object to or correct the unintentional misperception by the trial 
court concerning plenary review. Consequently, principles of 
waiver and invited error apply, precluding Payson City Corporation 
from now complaining of the alleged error. See State v. Anderson, 
929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) ("a party cannot take advantage of 
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
into committing the error"); see also State v. Kiriluk, 975 P. 2d 
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469, 475 (Utah Ct • App. 1999) (hold that manifest injustice 
exception has no application in cases where the party invited the 
very error complained of on appeal). Nevertheless, the district 
court's comments concerning plenary review were harmless for two 
reasons. First, they were made prior to oral arguments and, 
therefore, prior to any legal analysis by the district court of the 
legal arguments contained in the motions for summary judgment. 
Second, the district court corrected any misperception it may have 
had concerning the application of plenary review after taking the 
motions under advisement and thereafter issuing its well-reasoned 
Memorandum Decision (See R. 341-43, Memorandum Decision, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A) . The 
Memorandum Decision reveals that the district court did not weigh 
anew the underlying factual considerations of the City Council's 
denial. See, e.g., Xanthos, 685 P. 2d at 1035. Moreover, the 
Memorandum Decision provides no proof of and in fact contradicts 
any notion that the district court went beyond its role and decided 
the case according to its own notion of what would be in the best 
interests of the citizens of Payson City. Id. To the contrary, 
the district court merely determined, based on the almost complete 
lack of evidence in the record before it, that the reasons given by 
the City Council for denying the R-2-75 rezone application "are 
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without sufficient factual basis." (See R. 342, Memorandum 
Decision). 
Payson City Corporation also argues that the district court 
failed to grant the City Council's decision the requisite 
presumption of validity or judicial deference. See Brief of 
Appellant, p. 17. Again, a review of the complete record on appeal 
in conjunction with the district court's Memorandum Decision 
indicates otherwise. 
During a hearing intended for oral arguments on the pending 
motions for summary judgment, which was well before the issuance of 
its Memorandum Decision, the district court expressed concern about 
the lack of basis to deny the rezone in the minutes of the public 
hearings on the rezone applications (See R. 445, Transcript of 
Hearing Held September 8, 1998, p. 3, lines 1-11, p. 4-5). 
Consequently, the district court directed Payson City Corporation 
to prepare findings setting forth the basis of the City Council's 
denials of the rezone applications (See R. 282, Minutes Oral 
Arguments; R. 284-85, Order). The district court's effort to allow 
the City Council another opportunity to provide a basis for its 
denials of Plaintiffs' rezone applications, which it clearly was 
not required to do, is consistent with the requisite presumption of 
validity vis-a-vis the statutory duty the court has to determine 
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whether the land use decision is "supported by substantial 
evidence." Springville Citizens, 979 P.2d at 336-37. 
The Memorandum Decision also demonstrates the presumption of 
validity given by the district court of the City Council's decision 
and, at the same time, diligently reviewing the decision for the 
requisite quantum of evidence, which it is also required to do. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001; accord Springville Citizens, 979 
P. 2d 336-37. The district court, in its Memorandum Decision, 
stated, "The stated reasons [by the City Council for denial of the 
R-2-75 rezone request] might normally be legally sufficient. 
However, they are without sufficient factual basis." (See R. 342, 
Memorandum Decision). 
The standard of judicial review utilized by the district court 
in the instant case is consistent with the standard set forth in 
both Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 and Springville Citizens. In its 
Memorandum Decision, the district court stated: 
The Court may reverse the City Council's 
denial of the zone change if the "action taken 
was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and 
capricious." Xanthos v, Board of Adjustment, 
685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). "Even if the 
reasons given in the motion adopted by the 
council might otherwise be legally sufficient, 
. . . the denial of a permit is arbitrary when 
the reasons are sufficient factual basis. . . 
. Citizen opposition is a consideration which 
must be weighted, but cannot be the sole basis 
for the decision to deny." Davis County v. 
Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1988) . The Court believes that the 
standard set forth in Davis County, although 
that case involved a denial of an application 
for a conditional use permit instead of a zone 
change, involves the same legal analysis as 
this case. 
This standard is essentially the same standard pronounced by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Springville Citizens, 979 P.2d at 336-37.8 
IV. THE PAYSON CITY COUNCIL'S DENIAL OF THE R-2-75 
REZONE REQUEST WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE 
IT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
In the case at bar, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the 
City Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was 
not supported by substantial evidence.9 Moreover, the record 
demonstrates that the City Council's decision was anything but the 
result of careful consideration. Instead of carefully considering 
the rezone application, the City Council arbitrarily and 
capriciously stated reasons for denying Plaintiffs' rezone request 
8Payson City Corporation's own argument supports and is therefore 
consistent with Plaintiffs' argument that the district court utilized 
the correct standard of judicial review in the course of issuing its 
Memorandum Decision. See Brief of Appellant, Argument II, pp. 17-19. 
Substantial evidence is defined as "that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion." See Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing First 
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)). "It is more than a mere 
'scintilla' of evidence . . . though 'something less than the weight 
of the evidence.'" Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. 
Hunnicutt, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)). 
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that have no evidentiary support in the record and which are in 
direct contradiction to the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
rezone request. 
Immediately following the public hearing on the R-2-75 rezone 
request, the City Council voted to deny the R-2-75 rezone "based on 
the General Plan recommendation, traffic concerns relating to the 
industrial park, and [the Planning Commission's] recommendation." 
(See id. at R. 231). In light of the evidence in the record, or 
essentially the total lack thereof, a reasonable mind could not 
reach the same conclusion as that of the City Council in the 
instant case. 
The City Council displayed a total lack of consistency and due 
consideration when it denied the R-2-75 rezone request "based on 
the General Plan recommendation" (Id.) . In direct contradiction to 
the Payson City General Plan (see R. 50 and 52) , the Official 
Payson City General Plan Map, which was adopted within months of 
City Council's denial, expressly provides for large areas of 
residential use west of 1-15 (See R. 43, Official General Plan 
Map) . The subject R-2-75 application permits residential and 
density usage totally compatible with three of the four abutting 
properties or communities and an overall density that is consistent 
with the large and expansive multi-family neighborhood areas 
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directly to the east of the Property (See R. 42, Payson Planning 
Zone Map). 
By citing "traffic concerns relating to the industrial park" 
as a reason to deny the R-2-75 rezone application, the City Council 
ignored the fact that the record is completely devoid of any 
evidence before it, credible or otherwise, that the requested R-2-
75 zone would adversely impact traffic (See R. 342, Memorandum 
Decision, f3) . The sole contrary evidence in the record were 
unsupported assertions by citizens with no known experience or 
training in the traffic engineering or planning fields (See R. 231-
33, Payson City Council Meeting Minutes, March 20, 1996). This is 
hardly the evidence upon which a reasonable mind would reasonably 
rely for purposes of denying a rezone application, see Springville 
Citizens For a Better Community v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 
332, 336-37 (Utah 1999), particularly when viewed in light of the 
fact that the Planning Commission Staff had previously recommended 
that the Planning Commission recommend approval of the rezone 
application (See R. 173, Planning Commission Staff Report). Cf. 
Davis County v. Clearfield, 756 P.2d 704, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(stating, in conditional use permit case using arbitrary and 
capricious - substantial evidence standard of review, that 
"*[c]itizen opposition is a consideration which must be weighed, 
but cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny'" and local 
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government entity "'must rely on facts, and not mere emotion or 
local opinion'" (citations omitted)). Contrastingly, Mr. Jim 
Wilbert, an expert with twenty years of planning experience, 
studied the proposed rezone and then appeared before the City 
Council, speaking in favor of the rezone because it "allows for 
affordable housing near the industrial park." (See id. at 232). 
Finally, the City Council mistakenly relied upon " [the 
Planning Commission's] recommendation as a reason to deny the R-2-
75 rezone application inasmuch as the basis upon which the Planning 
Commission's recommendation was based was equally, if not more so, 
factually deficient than that of the City Council's. After 
studying Plaintiff's R-2-75 rezone application, the Planning 
Commission's own staff, by way of a Staff Report, dated March 20, 
1996, recommended that the Planning Commission recommend approval 
to the Payson City Council of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application 
(See R. 173, Planning Commission Staff Report). Moreover, during 
a Planning Commission Meeting On February 8, 1996, when Plaintiffs' 
R-2-75 rezone application came before the Commission (See R. 166-
67, Payson Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, February 8, 1996), 
Chairman Stewart readily acknowledged that because "there are 
already other residential developments in bhe surrounding area 
where this rezone would take place, there may not be a problem in 
rezoning this to R-2-7500." (See id.). Poised to recommend 
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approval, the Planning Commission instead recommended that the 
Payson City Council deny the R-2-75 rezone after hearing the public 
comments (See R. 153-55, Payson City Planning Commission Meeting 
Minutes, March 20, 1996). The explanation for the Planning 
Commission's recommendation became apparent through an Interoffice 
Memo from the Planning Commission to the City Council, which 
states, "The Planning Commission recommendation to the City Council 
was to not approve the [R-2-75] zone change because of the 
opposition of the neighbors in that area." (See R. Ill, Interoffice 
Memo). Consequently, it is readily apparent that any reliance by 
the City Council on the Planning Commission's recommendation was 
factually unfounded and fallacious. 
V. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE "REASONABLY DEBATABLE" 
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLIES TO THE CITY 
COUNCIL'S DECISION, THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CITY COUNCIL'S DENIAL OF 
PLAINTIFFS' R-2-75 REZONE APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS. 
Even under the "reasonably debatable" standard of judicial 
review set forth in Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P. 2d 245, 252 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), the City Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-
75 rezone application was arbitrary and capricious.10 In the Smith 
10Plaintiffs are cognizant of the statement set forth in the 
majority opinion in Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 3 88 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 24 (Utah Ct. App. February 10, 2000), where the court stated, 
"Indeed, we have found no Utah case, nor a case from any other 
jurisdiction, in which a zoning classification was reversed on 
30 
Inv. case, the court of appeals stated, u[I]f an ordinance 'could 
promote the general welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable 
that it is in the interest of the general welfare' we will uphold 
it." Id. (quoting Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 121, 
141 P.2d 704, 709 (1943)) (also citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118 (1926)); see also 
3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning & Planning 
§ 27A.03, at 27A-15 (1997) (phrasing inquiry as whether "the 
reasonableness of the action is 'fairly debatable'"). 
As specifically demonstrated above in Argument IV of the 
instant Brief, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that 
the City Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it 
was not supported by evidence that makes the reasonableness of the 
denial of the R-2-75 rezone application reasonably or fairly 
debatable. Based the dearth of evidence before the City Council as 
demonstrated by the record, there was nothing to support the 
reasonableness of the denial of the R-2-75 rezone application. 
While the record perhaps demonstrates that the reasonableness of 
grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 26. But see 
Kanfer v. Montgomery County Council, 3 73 A.2d 5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1977) (reversing trial court's affirmance of denial of rezoning 
classification application under "fairly debatable" rule as arbitrary 
and capricious); and Hall v. Korth, 244 So.2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1977) (affirming trial court's reversal of county commission's 
denial for rezone under "fairly debatable" rule as capricious and 
without reasonable basis in the record). 
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the City Council's decision is debatable, the total lack of 
evidence precludes the City Council's decision from being 
reasonably debatable. In fact, not only were the reasons given by 
the City Council for denying Plaintiffs' rezone request totally 
lacking in evidentiary support, there were in many ways, as 
previously discussed in detail, in direct contradiction to the 
record facts and circumstances surrounding the rezone request. 
Payson City Corporation argues at length in its Brief that the 
"public clamor" doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case 
because the City Council was acting in its legislative capacity. 
See Brief of Appellant, pp. 2 0-22; see also Harmon City, Inc. v. 
Draper City, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 27-28 (Utah Ct. App. February 
10, 2000) (holding "public clamor" doctrine inapplicable when 
legislative body acts in legislative capacity).11 By so arguing, 
Payson City Corporation misperceives the underlying basis for the 
district court's determination that City Council's decision was 
arbitrary and capricious. That being that there was an absence of 
factual basis and evidentiary support for the decision to deny the 
R-2-75 rezone application (See R. 341-43, Memorandum Decision 
("There being no sufficient factual basis for the decision to deny 
uPayson City Corporation's position concerning "public clamor" 
is indeed dubious inasmuch as it fails to cite any authority that 
expressly states that "public clamor" is applicable only in the 
limited circumstances involving an administrative decision. 
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Plaintiffs' application, the Court finds that the decision was 
based solely on citizen opposition and was therefore arbitrary and 
capricious."). 
Plaintiffs' acknowledge that the City Council appropriately 
held a public hearing and allowed interested parties to provide 
their ideas and opinions on the proposed rezone. However, the 
consideration of public input is only part of the information to be 
considered by the City Council prior to approving or denying a 
rezone application. In Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 
307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961), which was a zoning case, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
[I]t is entirely appropriate to hold public 
hearings and to allow any interested parties 
it desires to give information and to present 
their ideas on the matter. But this is by no 
means the only source from which the 
commissioners may obtain such information. 
From the fact that they hold public offices it 
is to be assumed that they have wide knowledge 
of the various conditions and activities in 
the county bearing on the question of proper 
zoning, such as the location of businesses, 
schools, roads and traffic conditions, growth 
in population and housing, the capacity of 
utilities, the existing classification of 
surrounding property, and the effect that the 
proposed reclassification may have on these 
things and upon the general orderly 
development of the county. In performing 
their duty it is both their privilege and 
obligation to take into consideration their 
own knowledge of such matters and also to 
gather available pertinent information from 
all possible sources and give consideration to 
it in making their determination. 
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Id. at 636 (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the record indisputably reveals that the 
City Council relied merely on public comment in the course of 
denying Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application. Moreover, the 
reasons provided by the City Council for its denial were in direct 
contradiction to the actual facts and circumstances surrounding the 
proposed rezone. Hence, the reasonableness of the City Council's 
decision is not even "fairly debatable." 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully ask that this 
Court affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs and for any other relief the Court deems just or 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
STATEMENT REGARDING METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Plaintiffs' counsel requests that the method of disposition of 
the instant appeal be by opinion designated "For Official 
Publication" for purposes of precedential value in future cases due 
to the significant issues in the instant appeal dealing with, among 
other things, the standard of judicial review to be utilized for 
reviewing municipal land use decisions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-1001. The aforementioned issues concern novel matters that 
are of continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of 
34 
the instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in 
the municipal land use decisions, which would benefit both the bar 
and public, respectively. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of April, 2000. 
JD\& WIGGINS, P . C . 
Scot t T ^ i g g M s 
At to rneys «£sZ£> P l a i n t i f f s 
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to 
be mailed by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following 
on this 26th day of April, 2000: 
Mr. Jody K Burnett 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 20JL Sou 
Salt Lak 
Suite 500 
84145-5678 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum A: Memorandum Decision 
Tab A 
Fourth Judic^Distrid: Courtt of 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BRADLEY, ET AL., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAYSON CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970400264 
DATE: January 21,1999 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: DaveBackman 
This matter came before the Court upon Plaintiffs' and Defendant's cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment. Having received and considered the Motions, together with memoranda in 
support of and opposition to the Motions, the Court hereby grants Plaintiffs' Motion, denies 
Defendant's Motion, and delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiffs applied to Pay son City to change the zone of their property from R-l-A to R-
2-75. Upon initial review of the application, the Planning Commission Staff issued an interoffice 
memo to the Mayor and the City Council members recommending approval of the zone change 
and for the Planning Commission and the City Council to hold a joint public hearing on the 
matter. On March 20, 1996, a joint public hearing was held and several landowners in the area 
expressed their opinions concerning the proposed change. After the public hearing, the Planning 
Commission voted to recommend denial of the zone change based on the opinions expressed at 
the public hearing. The City Council then voted to deny the change based on: (1) how it would 
be contrary to the General Plan; (2) traffic concerns relating to the industrial park; and (3) the 
Planning Commission's recommendation. 
Opinion of the Court 
Summary judgment is proper only if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." URCP 56(c). The Court must 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 
855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
The Court may reverse the City Council's denial of the zone change if the "action taken 
was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious." Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 
P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). "Even if the reasons given in the motion adopted by the council 
might otherwise be legally sufficient,... the denial of a permit is arbitrary when the reasons are 
without sufficient factual basis.... Citizen opposition is a consideration which must be weighed, 
but cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny." Davis County v. Clearfield CityT 756 P.2d 
704, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Court believes that the standard set forth in Davis County. 
although that case involved a denial of an application for a conditional use permit instead of a 
zone change, involves the same legal analysis as this case. 
The Court finds that the City Council's decision to deny Plaintiffs' first application was 
arbitrary and capricious. The City Council stated that it based its decision on: (1) how the zone 
change would be contrary to the General Plan; (2) traffic concerns relating to the industrial park; 
and (3) the Planning Commission's recommendation. The stated reasons might normally be 
legally sufficient. However, they are without sufficient factual basis. The traffic concern was not 
a sufficient reason for the denial since there was no evidence before the City Council that the 
proposed zone change would in fact create traffic concerns. Also, there was no factual basis to 
rely on the Planning Commission's recommendation. The Planning Commission initially 
recommended approving the application and then changed its mind after the public hearing on 
March 20, 1996. The only reasons the Commission gave for its sudden reversal were the 
comments the neighbors made at the public hearing. Accordingly, the City Council's reliance on 
the Commission's recommendation was factually unfounded. Similarly, neither the Planning 
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Commission nor the City Council provided any factual basis for the reason that the zone change 
would be contrary to the General Plan. The Court notes that from the zoning maps provided to 
the Court it appears that there are already residentially zoned areas on the west side of the 1-15 
buffer. The mere fact that Plaintiffs' property is on the west side does not establish that it is 
contrary to the General Plan. 
There being no sufficient factual basis for the decision to deny Plaintiffs' application, the 
Court finds that the decision was based solely on citizen opposition and was therefore arbitrary 
and capricious. Having reversed the denial of the application for a zone change from R-l-A to 
R-2-75, the Court need not analyze the denial of the second application. 
Order 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The zone change 
from R-l-A to R-2-75 is hereby approved. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED this day of January, 1999. 
cc: Mark E. Arnold, Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Diana L. Garrett, Attorney for Plaintiffs 
David C. Tuckett, Attorney for Payson City 
David L. Church, Attorney for Payson City 
3 
